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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis considers why terrorism persists in Mindanao, Philippines, despite the 
government’s many counterterrorism measures. This thesis reviews the historical 
narratives, socioeconomics, and political challenges of the Moro problem. It finds that 
terrorism and violence continue for a number of reasons, including but not limited to 
unresolved grievances such as Islamist ideology. Other grievances include displacement 
by internal north-to-south migration, relative deprivation, and perceptions of 
marginalization. Moreover, terrorist groups continue to evolve and adapt to the changing 
security and political landscape, presenting new challenges to the state. Hence, this thesis 
also examines the Philippine government’s various counterterrorism (CT) strategies and 
finds some gaps, particularly a lack of centralization and synchronization unifying all CT 
efforts. This thesis concludes that terrorism continues because of a government response 
that focuses on security rather than the root causes of the conflict, including 
socioeconomic and political factors. Thus, this thesis recommends that the Philippine 
government should not only consolidate CT efforts into a single institutional framework, 
but also pursue comprehensive and sustainable economic policies and effective 
governance that actually address the root causes of the persistent conflict in Mindanao. 
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The threat of terrorism and violence in the Philippines, especially in Mindanao,
persists despite the government’s counterterrorism measures. Acts of terrorism have cost 
lives and have continuously undermined the development and stability of the country. 
Terrorist incidents that have happened in recent years, like the Maute/IS/ASG siege of 
Marawi city, suicide bombings in Sulu province, and other atrocities in Mindanao, indicate 
that the counterterrorism strategies and approaches of the government are not sufficient to 
effectively address the threat of terrorism. 
Against this backdrop, this thesis explores the following question: Why have 
terrorism and violence continued to persist, particularly in Mindanao? The purpose of this 
study is to provide a clearer understanding of the root causes and other factors enabling 
terrorism to continue. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW
To address the major research question, this literature review critically analyzes,
evaluates, and compares prior research studies and other scholarly sources on terrorism. 
1. Definition and Causes of Terrorism
Bruce Hoffman defines “terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear 
through violence or the threat of violence in pursuit of political change.”1 Terrorism is 
typically perpetrated by terror groups that have grievances that lead them to commit these 
acts. It has become an attractive strategy for organizations of diverse ideologies who want 
to attract attention for their cause, air their grievances, provoke a government, appeal for 
sympathy, or promote the adherence of the faithful.2 Violence has become a means for 
terrorist groups to pursue their causes and goals.  
1 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 3. 
2 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July 1981): 396, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/421717. 
2 
The root causes of terrorism are often attributed to “causal relationships in social, 
economic, political, and demographic conditions.”3 Poverty and social inequality are 
among the primary root causes of terrorism. According to William O’Neill, “poverty of 
resources, combined with poverty of prospects, choices and respect, help enable terrorism 
to thrive.”4 Poverty stems from underdevelopment, poor or weak governance, and poor 
education that lacks capacity to reduce terrorism.5 Economic inequality within a certain 
group or between groups often drives conflicts.6 Furthermore, poverty has become a driver 
of terrorism as it makes recruitment easy to lure poor and uneducated individuals. 
Factors such as lack of access to resources, positions in the government, or to 
territory have been connected to the grievances of terrorist groups. Similarly, grievances 
arise when people perceive that a government’s political orders are denying their basic 
rights as individuals and as a group.7 These can manifest in the political and economic 
deprivation of certain marginalized groups. Ethno-nationalism has become a common 
grievance that can be found in some narratives of extremist groups in recruitment and 
terroristic activities. Furthermore, demographic elements have been also offered significant 
conditions for the emergence of terrorism. Key demographic conditions include uneven 
migration, quick population growth, and urbanization.8 These factors have produced 
unemployment and poverty and brought disaffection when economic opportunities have 
been denied a group of people, creating ethnic and social imbalance in the society.9 
 
3 Edward Newman, “Exploring the ‘Root Causes’ of Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, 
no. 8 (December 2006): 749, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100600704069. 
4 William O’Neill, “Beyond the Slogans: How Can the UN Respond to Terrorism?” (paper presented 
at International Peace Academy (IPA) Conference on “Responding to Terrorism: What Role for the United 
Nations?,” Chadbourne and Parke, New York City, 2002). 
5 O’Neill. 
6 Jeni Klugman, Social and Economic Policies to Prevent Complex Humanitarian Emergencies 
Lessons from Experience (Helsinki, Finland: UNU/WIDER, 1999), https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/
default/files/PB1999-002.pdf. 
7 O’Neill, “Beyond the Slogans: How Can the UN Respond to Terrorism?” 
8 Jeffrey Ian Ross, “Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model,” 
Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 3 (August 1993): 30, http://www.jstor.org/stable/424809. 
9 Ross, 30. 
3 
2. Enablers of Terrorism 
Globalization has dramatically contributed to the dissemination of ideologies, 
technology, and support systems that enable terrorism. According to Audrey Kurth Cronin, 
“the current wave of international terrorism, characterized by unpredictable and 
unprecedented threats from nonstate actors, not only is a reaction to globalization but is 
facilitated by it.”10 Globalization has importantly enabled terrorist methods and activities 
by facilitating terrorists’ movement, providing the use of new technologies, and expanding 
or changing their sources of support.11  
Specifically, globalization has aided terrorist groups to reach other countries where 
they can access commerce and international businesses.12 This reach has also permitted 
terrorist groups like Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, and other terrorist groups to cross international 
borders and form terrorist cells.13 Movement across porous and unguarded borders has 
enabled terrorist groups to bring in illegal materials like explosives, firearms, money, and 
other items to support their terrorist activities, including teaching, training, and attacks.14 
These movements have also allowed terrorist groups to gather, disseminate, and act on 
different information.15  
Technologies have similarly aided terrorist groups’ activities, especially in 
communicating and coordinating their actions.16 As an example, the coordinated attacks 
on the U.S. embassies in 1998 and on the New York World Trade Center in 2001 
 
10 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,” International 
Security 27, no. 3 (January 2003): 30, https://doi.org/10.1162/01622880260553624. 
11 Cronin, 46. 
12 Cronin, 48. 
13 Cronin, 49. 
14 Cronin, 48–49. 
15 Cronin, 49. 
16 Dorothy E. Denning, “Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool For 
Influincing Foreign Policy,” in Networks and Netwars, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Future 
of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 281, http://www.jstor.org/
stable/10.7249/mr1382osd.13. 
4 
demonstrated the use of technologies in planning and execution.17 Technology also has 
broadened the range of sources for collecting and distributing funding for terrorist 
activities. These sources include “nonprofit organizations and charities” being used as 
fronts and legal financial institutions to divert funds for illegal activities.18 Additionally, 
globalization has provided networks and systems that facilitate terrorists’ administrative 
and operational requirements as they conduct their activities.  
3. Adaptations of Terrorist Groups 
As different states have developed new approaches to address terrorism, extremist 
groups have been able to innovate and adapt over time. According to Bill Braniff and Assaf 
Moghadam, terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda have persisted in the Middle East despite 
U.S. and its allies’ pressure.19 After the 9/11 bombings and with U.S. military actions, 
terrorist groups adapted according to what resources they had.20 These adaptations 
manifested themselves in evolutionary changes pertaining to three realms: strategy, 
ideology, and structure.  
In the realm of strategy, terrorist groups have planned their actions using available 
resources and technology that can help them in their activities.21 In the case of Al-Qaeda, 
they used media production to compensate for the loss of their infrastructure (like the 
training camps in Afghanistan) and their corresponding centrality among jihadist groups.22 
Using available resources, terrorist groups were able to reestablish limited safe havens in 
their respective regional jihadist movements and were able to share ideologies and 
 
17 Simon Reeve, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama Bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism 
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999) 260–266. 
18 Raphael F. Perl, Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy, CRS Issue Brief No. 95112 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2001), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB55/crs20010913.pdf. 
19 William Braniff and Assaf Moghadam, “Al Qaeda’s Post-9/11 Evolution: An Assessment,” 
START, accessed May 4, 2021, https://www.start.umd.edu/publication/al-qaedas-post-911-evolution-
assessment. 
20 Braniff and Moghadam. 
21 Braniff and Moghadam. 
22 Braniff and Moghadam. 
5 
resources. In the ideological realm, terrorist groups have continued to conduct propaganda 
and ideological indoctrination to recruit as many vulnerable people as possible.23 The Al-
Qaeda “harmonized and globalized” their local grievance narratives to other countries, 
enabling Al-Qaeda to call for a global religious war.24 Moreover, terrorist groups like Al-
Qaeda have evolved structurally; creating geographically connected terrorist groups, 
giving terror groups advantages to adapt to existing security environments.25 These 
regional and global connections have created formal affiliations among “geographically 
dispersed groups, informally partnered with geographically co-located groups and has 
fostered a virtual safe-haven with few barriers to entry.”26 These connections originally 
came from the Middle East and are now seen in other parts of the world, offering new 
evidence of the transfer of knowledge, skills, and tactics to different regional cells and 
countries.27  
Looking into these different causes and factors enables us to better understand why 
terrorists continue to commit terrorism. It is also important to examine the drivers and 
enablers to influences and ideologies that were inculcated in these people, persuading 
individuals to commit acts of terrorism. The understanding of terrorists’ motivations, 
environments, and dynamics of terrorism is necessary to have an effective counterterrorism 
response. 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES FOR THE 
CONTINUED TERRORISM IN THE PHILIPPINES 
Terrorism persists in southern Philippines, as seen by terror attacks such as the 2017 
Marawi Siege and the 2019 suicide bombings in Sulu province, which resulted in the death 
of civilians and destruction of properties and rocked the country’s security and stability. 
This thesis tests the hypothesis that Islamic terrorism persists in Mindanao because the root 
 
23 Braniff and Moghadam. 
24 Braniff and Moghadam. 
25 Braniff and Moghadam. 
26 Braniff and Moghadam. 
27 Assaf Moghadam, “Shifting Trends in Suicide Attacks,” Combating Terrorism Center at West 
Point, January 15, 2009, https://ctc.usma.edu/shifting-trends-in-suicide-attacks/. 
6 
causes and grievances of the Filipino Muslims have not been comprehensively and 
holistically addressed by the government. These root causes and grievances include the 
historical marginalization of Filipino Muslims, political deprivations, and socio-political 
factors drastically affecting the lives of the Muslims in Mindanao. Despite the gains of the 
government against terrorists, extremist groups continuously evolve and adjust their 
strategies and tactics in pursuing their political and religious goals.  
To better understand why terrorism persists, it is necessary to know the grievances 
and root causes of terrorism. It is also necessary to examine the different factors that enable 
and drive terrorism to continue. Likewise, it is important to look at the groups’ adaptations 
that enabled them to survive through time. Finally, looking at the government’s response 
to the problem can also provide lessons to improve the government’s efforts in countering 
the challenges of terrorism. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis intends to present a single case study of the persistence of Islamic 
terrorism in Mindanao. This thesis primarily reviews historical narratives of the origin of 
the Moro problem during the Spanish colonization up to the present period. This study also 
examines the organizational structure of the different extremist groups in Mindanao and 
the internal adaptations that enable them to survive the counterterrorism efforts of the 
government. To enable the analysis, this study will use scholarly articles as well as relevant 
data from departments and agencies of the Philippine Government. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized in five chapters to provide readers with a clear 
understanding of the different factors driving terrorism and the efforts of the Armed Forces 
of the Philippines (AFP) to counter this pernicious problem. 
Chapter I has provided a brief background of the study and the main research 
question it seeks to answer. It also covered the importance of the study and briefly discusses 
the literature available and the research methodology used in the study. 
7 
Chapter II provides the reader with insight into the root causes and grievances 
leading to the rise of different Islamist groups in the Philippines. The chapter then explains 
the complexities of the sources of those grievances in terms of social, economic, political, 
and demographic conditions affecting the region. 
Chapter III analyzes the different Islamist groups’ characteristics and means of 
survival despite the government’s counterterrorism efforts. The chapter then examines the 
different patterns and trends enabling these Islamist groups to adapt and survive.  
Chapter IV covers the Philippine government’s counterterrorism strategy and 
approaches. An examination of the effectiveness of the government’s effort in addressing 
the different factors that drive terrorism in Mindanao is presented.  
Chapter V provides the findings of the study, presents conclusions, and provides 
recommendations for policy improvements and further research. 
  
8 
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II. CONFLICTS AND TERRORISM IN MINDANAO: 
UNDERSTANDING THE ROOT CAUSES  
The threat of terrorism and conflict persist in Mindanao, Philippines, despite the 
government’s effort to address the problem. In fact, violence here has persisted from the 
colonial era to the present and is considered “one of the world’s longest and bloodiest 
running armed conflicts.”28 Because of this recurring problem, the country has suffered 
many negative impacts such as loss of infrastructure and businesses, armed conflicts, and 
the death of innocent unarmed civilians.29 Furthermore, the negative impacts of terrorism 
have put the country in a bad light and created a dreadful image that the “Philippines is a 
virtual war zone and a haven for terrorists and insurgents.”30 Given the negative impacts 
and complexity of terrorism, it is imperative to study the multi-faceted root causes 
contributing to the security problems in Mindanao, which include historical, political, and 
socioeconomic factors.  
 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The terrorism and armed conflict evident in Mindanao today dates back more than 
300 years to the Spanish colonization of the Philippines and its quest to Christianize the 
whole country.31 The second-largest island and southernmost part of the Philippines (see 
Figure 1), Mindanao is home to the majority of Filipino Muslims in the country. This group 
comprises about 5.6% of the country’s total population of 110 million Filipinos and about 
24% of the island’s entire population.32 The experiences of the Muslims from the colonial 
 
28 Fatimah Husein, Jerson Benia Narciso, and Bernard Adeney Risakotta, “A Historical Narrative and 
Critical Analysis of the Roots and Causes of Conflict in the Southern Philippines,” Journal Kawistara 2, 
no. 2 (August 2012): 106, https://doi.org/10.22146/kawistara.3966. 
29 Andrew Tan, “The Indigenous Roots of Conflict in Southeast Asia: The Case of Mindanao,” in 
After Bali:The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Stallion Press, 2003), 110–12, 
https://doi.org/10.1142/9789812561749_0005. 
30 Husein, Narciso, and Risakotta, “A Historical Narrative and Critical Analysis of the Roots and 
Causes of Conflict in the Southern Philippines,” 106. 
31 Tan, “The Indigenous Roots of Conflict in Southeast Asia,” 98–99. 
32 “Factsheet on Islam in Mindanao,” Philippine Statistics Authority Region XI, September 28, 2017, 
http://rsso11.psa.gov.ph/article/factsheet-islam-mindanao. 
10 
period up to the present time have been continuously feeding the grievances and causes of 
conflicts in Mindanao. The deep historical and domestic roots affecting the Muslim 
population can be traced from the Spanish colonial period, through American occupation, 
and up to Filipino rule in the post-colonial period. 
 
Figure 1. Map of Mindanao and the Philippines33 
1. Spanish Colonial Period 
Muslim rebellion in the Philippines began during the Philippines’ colonization by 
Spain, which halted Islamization of the country in 1565.34 Spanish colonizers branded the 
 
33 Source: “Map of Mindanao and the Philippines,” National Counterterrorism Center, January 2014, 
https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/abu_sayyaf.html. 
34 Andrew Tan, “Southeast Asia as the ‘Second Front’ in the War against Terrorism: Evaluating the 
Threat and Responses,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 2 (June 2010): 115, https://doi.org/
10.1080/09546550312331293067. 
11 
Muslims as Moro like the North African Moors, who were described as “outlaws, bandits, 
pirates, and slave traders,” which started the origin of a specifically Moro identity.35 When 
the Spaniards arrived, the Muslims already had Sultanates in different parts of Mindanao, 
Sulu, Tawi-tawi, Palawan, and other parts of the country including Manila.36 The 
Spaniards were able to defeat the Muslims in Luzon but failed to totally conquer the 
sultanates of Mindanao and Sulu due to strong resistance.37 In their attempts to further 
colonize and suppress the Moros, the Spaniards recruited Filipino Christians as 
mercenaries to fight against the Muslims.38 This resulted in the opposition of the Muslims 
not only to the Spaniards but also to the Filipino Christians. The Muslims showed by words 
and deeds their opposition to the Spaniards’ colonial attempts to deprive them of their 
independence. One of these actions was the appearance of the sabilallahs, or juramentados 
as the Spaniards called them, which were Moro fighters waging an Islamic jihad and whose 
only mission was to kill as many enemies as possible.39 The Moro struggle of the Muslims 
against the Spanish colonizers created deeply entrenched ethnic and religious stereotypes, 
and Americans and Filipinos inherited this culture of mistrust toward Muslims in 
Mindanao.40 
2. American Colonial Period 
During the American occupation (1899–1946), violence and armed conflict in 
Mindanao had become more intense as Moros refused to be subjugated by their new 
 
35 Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, “Mindanao: Nationalism, Jihadism and Frustrated Peace,” Journal of 
Asian Security and International Affairs 3, no. 1 (April 2016): 66, https://doi.org/10.1177/
2347797015626046. 
36 Husein, Narciso, and Risakotta, “A Historical Narrative and Critical Analysis of the Roots and 
Causes of Conflict in the Southern Philippines,” 106. 
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colonizers.41 Although Mindanao was not totally conquered by Spain, it was handed over 
to the United States through the Treaty of Paris, which forced the integration of the Moros 
into the new American system of government.42 This ignited new Moro resistance that 
resulted in bloody confrontations between the Americans and the Muslims. However, the 
Moro resistance weakened, which led to the speedy integration of the Muslims in the newly 
organized and “Filipinized” Philippine legislature where politics and governance were 
controlled by Filipino Christians.43 At the same time, Christians from Luzon and the 
Visayas began to migrate south with the support of the American administration, and later 
the Philippine Commonwealth, as part of a policy to develop Mindanao as a new frontier.44 
Data and trends show that migration of non-Muslims increased through the occupation and 
post-occupation years (1918 to 1970) in Muslim majority areas, especially in Cotabato and 
Zamboanga (see Table 1).  
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As an outcome, by 1976, the Moros who once owned and occupied 98% of the land 
in Mindanao now owned less than 17%; these lands are mostly remote and in unproductive 
areas.46 Likewise, the proportion of Muslims in the population of Mindanao had fallen to 
23% by 1980, down from an estimated 76% in 1903.47 The migration programs eventually 
altered the religious, political, cultural, economic, and ethnic balance in Mindanao, causing 
the marginalization of Muslims not only by colonial powers but also by Christian 
Filipinos.48  
3. Post-Colonial Period 
After the Second World War, with Christians in control of political affairs in the 
Philippines, perceived deprivation and marginalization among the Muslims continued. 
Christians were able to control the “economic and political spheres even in some 
predominantly Moro areas.”49 This demographic change brought conflicts in different 
Muslim areas, which further threatened the religious and political authority of Muslim 
leaders.50 The continuous migration of Christians angered the Muslim leaders, who began 
pushing for a separate land and government to be led and governed by Muslims. Thus, it 
was socio-political, religious, and economic deprivations that led to the rise of separatist 
Islamist groups fought against the Philippine government.51 
 
46 Leonardo N. Mercado, Dialogue and Faith: A Philippine View (Manila: Logos Publication Inc, 
2009), 224–25. 
47 May, “History, Demography and Factionalism: Obstacles to Conflict Resolution through Autonomy 
in the Southern Philippines,” 280. 
48 Husein, Narciso, and Risakotta, “A Historical Narrative and Critical Analysis of the Roots and 
Causes of Conflict in the Southern Philippines,” 107. 
49 Husein, Narciso, and Risakotta, 107. 
50 May, “History, Demography and Factionalism: Obstacles to Conflict Resolution through Autonomy 
in the Southern Philippines,” 280. 
51 Husein, Narciso, and Risakotta, “A Historical Narrative and Critical Analysis of the Roots and 
Causes of Conflict in the Southern Philippines,” 107. 
14 
B. POLITICAL CONTEXT 
From 1965 to 1971, Muslim students started gaining awareness and began to form 
political movements to fight for their rights of “self-determination as a people with distinct 
history and identity.”52 These political movements and organizations eventually led to the 
emergence of different Islamist groups. Although divided, some Muslim groups believed 
that Mindanao must be a separate Islamic state that deserves freedom and independence.53 
This awareness and desire for independence was further triggered by the alleged killing of 
Muslim military recruits in Corregidor Island. In 1968, the Jabidah Massacre, also known 
as the Corregidor Massacre, heightened the Moros’ grievances against the Philippine 
government. Young Muslim army trainees were allegedly executed by the country’s armed 
forces for “Operation Merdeka,” a code name for an operation to regain Sabah from 
Malaysia by force to strengthen the territorial claims of the Philippines.54 Even so, it has 
been argued by the national government in Manila that the Jabidah Massacre was a hoax 
and did not happen at all. The alleged massacre, however, led to the Moro political 
movement to aim for a separate Islamic state.55 Furthermore, the incident led to the 
establishment of secessionist groups including the Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) that splintered into different 
radicalized factions—the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), Abu Sayaff 
Group (ASG), and the Maute /Islamic State (IS) of Lanao del Sur group. 
The different Islamist and violent extremist groups continue to pursue their 
respective political goals. The MNLF, the oldest Islamist extremist group, was established 
in 1969 by Nur Misuari, an ethnic Tausug from Sulu, “aimed to liberate Mindanao from 
‘Filipino colonialism’ and establish an independent Bangsamoro Republik.”56 The MILF, 
a splinter group of the MNLF, established in 1978 by former MNLF Vice Chairman 
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Hashim Salamat, aimed to create a Moro Islamic state in Mindanao through jihad or holy 
war against its enemies.57 The Islamic state that the MILF aspired to would be named the 
Mindanao Islamic Republic (MIR) that would have an established government system that 
upholds and applies Shariah law.58 Both the MNLF and the MILF groups have engaged 
in separate peace negotiations and agreements with the government for their respective 
demands and goals that were not totally settled. The BIFF, a faction of the MILF that was 
established in 2010 by Umbra Kato, has aimed to disrupt and hamper the peace negotiations 
between the government and the MILF, which subsequently announced in July 2014 its 
alliance with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).59 Another splinter group of the 
MNLF, the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG), which means “bearer of the sword,” was founded 
by a former MNLF jihadist in Afghanistan named Adburajak Abubakar Janjalani with the 
main goal of creating an independent and exclusive Moro Islamic state in Mindanao.60 The 
ASG espouses violent religious extremism and is notable for the group’s acts of terrorism 
such as kidnappings, bombings, and assassinations.61 Lastly, the Maute Group or the 
Islamic State (IS) in Lanao, a splinter of the MILF, was established by brothers Omar and 
Abdullah Maute and pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2015.62 The Maute Group, which led 
the Marawi Siege in 2017 with fractions of ASG and BIFF together with foreign fighters, 
sought to form an Islamic territory in Marawi as part of an “East Asia Wilayah” for ISIS.63 
While the groups differ in their respective ideologies, motivations, and approaches, their 
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central political goal is to establish an autonomous or independent Islamic state governed 
by the Filipino Muslims.64  
C. SOCIOECONOMIC CONTEXT 
The Moro struggle for an independent Mindanao state has a complex historical 
background emanating from different factors such as economic and socio-political 
causes.65 The different socioeconomic issues have continuously been included in the 
narratives for recruitment and propaganda by these groups. These socioeconomic issues—
including poverty, economic hardships, ethnic and religious marginalization, and 
frustrations with the government—serve as the critical drivers in the radicalization of 
Muslims in the Philippines that push individuals or groups to terrorism and violent 
extremism.66  
Colonial powers have greatly affected the economic life of the Muslims in 
Mindanao. Both the Spaniards and the Americans disrupted the “flow of trade between the 
Muslims and outside traders,” which was aggravated by the influx of Christian migrants 
from Luzon and the Visayas.67 Mohagher Iqbal, the MILF peace panel chair who used the 
pseudonym Salah Jubair, contends that “Spain came to the Philippines not so much for the 
cross, but in most instances, religion was merely used to justify Satanic lust for worldly 
gain and glory.”68 The disruptions in the productive economic life of Muslims pushed them 
to extreme poverty. Likewise, the Christian transmigration program started by Americans 
and continued after independence led to the loss of Muslims’ ancestral lands, making it one 
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of the major issues and grievances that Islamist groups continue to raise in their armed 
struggle.  
The continued violence and armed confrontations have also adversely affected the 
economic conditions and livelihoods of the Muslims in Mindanao. Due to violence and 
conflict, people are deprived of economic programs that would attract business 
opportunities and investments that would eventually improve the living conditions of the 
Moros.69 Studies have shown that the provinces with the “lowest income, the highest 
poverty incidence, and the worst standard of living” are found in the Autonomous Region 
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).70 The latest data from the Philippine Statistic Authority 
(PSA) showed that five out of six areas had high poverty rates within the Muslim region 
(see Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Poverty Incidence by Region (1st Half of 2018)71 
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Moreover, Muslims’ continuing perceptions of discrimination and alienation 
caused by Christian Filipinos and allegedly by the government have also prevented them 
from accessing quality social services like education, as well as employment and other 
economic opportunities.72 Biases and negative stereotypes and anti-Muslim sentiments 
have further affected their access to clinical services, proper education, and other essential 
social services, thus contributing considerably to their economic problems.73 Accordingly, 
numerous youth from the rural areas are apparently not attending school and instead 
working as laborers, thus, making it easier for them to follow those extremist organizations 
as their only way to success and prosperity.74 According to the 2017 Department of 
Education data, the ARMM has the lowest net enrollment rates both in elementary and 
secondary education (see Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. Net Enrollment Rate in Elementary and Secondary 
Education in the Philippines, 201775 
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Anti-Moro and anti-Islam sentiment from colonial times has created negative 
impressions within the present Filipino cultures, contributing to the grievances of different 
Islamist and terrorist groups. The term “Moro,” which the Spaniards used, arose from 
biased ideas, and conveyed negative points of view against the Filipino Muslims.76 Most 
of the Christians have regarded Muslims as being “troublemakers and violent,” and 
maliciously associated them with terrorism and extremism due to the high number of 
terrorist incidents in Mindanao.77 Negative Moro stereotypes have been opposed by 
Muslims who claim that Islam is a religion of peace and civilization.78 The labeling and 
stereotyping of Islam have been perceived by Muslims as an insult not only to them as a 
people but most especially to their religion.79 The different Islamist groups, like the foreign 
terrorist groups founded by Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, believe that their religion is 
threatened and Muslims should participate in jihad or holy war in defense of their 
religion.80  
D. CONCLUSION 
Threats to Muslim religious beliefs, culture, and identity have driven individuals or 
groups of Muslims to take extreme actions and terrorist activities in Mindanao. The 
historical experiences of foreign colonization and the perceived marginalization of 
Muslims caused by Christian Filipinos have been primarily seen as actions against Islam 
and have led to a continuous struggle for a separate and independent state for Muslims. In 
addition to this political grievance, widespread poverty and economic hardships, the 
seizure of ancestral lands, lack of access to education and opportunity, and other economic 
deprivations have continuously been included in the narratives of the Moro cause. The root 
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causes therefore are a combination of political and socioeconomic issues that require a 
comprehensive and a whole-nation approach in which all sectors of the society, especially 
the Muslim communities, participate. This complex root cause of terrorism and violence 
in Mindanao require a deep understanding of Muslim cultural and religious elements to 
address their grievances and ultimately terrorism. It further requires the need to understand 
and know more about the different Islamist groups to address the root causes and critical 
drivers of terrorism.  
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III. RADICALIZATION, VIOLENT EXTREMISM, AND 
EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIST GROUPS IN MINDANAO 
The rise of different Islamist groups in Mindanao is the result of a complex mixture 
of historical, political, and socioeconomic factors that have afflicted the Philippines for 
centuries. The 2020 Global Terrorism Index indicated the Philippines on the tenth rank in the 
world for being greatly affected by terrorism.81 The radicalization of Filipino Muslims finds 
its roots in the historical struggle against political and economic deprivation, marginalization, 
and injustices.82 The abuses and experiences of the Muslims starting from the colonial era up 
to the disputes with Filipino Christians over the unresolved Moro problems have led to the 
emergence of different separatist and terrorist groups in Mindanao. Islamist groups have used 
these grievances to justify violence and terroristic activities in attaining their political or 
religious objectives.83 The Bangsamoro84 issue in Mindanao has led to the radicalization and 
creation of different secessionist groups and violent extremist groups in pursuit of their goals.  
A. DIFFERENT ISLAMIST GROUPS IN MINDANAO 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the main Muslim groups that have come out of 
Mindanao are the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF), Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), Abu Sayaff Group (ASG), and 
the Maute/IS Group. These groups are examined in the following paragraphs. 
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1. Moro National Liberation Front 
The MNLF is the oldest Muslim separatist group in the Philippines. The MNLF was 
organized in the early 1970s by Nur Misuari, a Tausug from Sulu and a professor of the 
University of the Philippines, who was aligned more towards secular-nationalist 
movements.85 The communist orientation of Misuari and the MNLF originated when Misuari 
joined with some Muslim youths the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), organized by the 
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).86 During the Marcos regime, the MNLF aimed 
to liberate Mindanao and achieve independence for its own Bangsamoro Republik.87 
Although the MNLF was not tagged as a terror group, it was believed that the group was 
involved in some terroristic activities like bombings in different parts of Mindanao.88 From 
1972 to 1976, the estimated casualties (including both military and civilian) reached about 
120,000.89 The intense armed fighting and bloodshed ultimately led to peace negotiations 
between the government and Moro rebels. 
In 1976, the MNLF and Marcos administration entered peace negotiations with the 
assistance of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and Libya. This culminated 
in the signing of the Tripoli Agreement, which resulted in a truce between the government 
and the MNLF and incorporated the 13 Muslim provinces in the autonomous region in 
Mindanao.90 After the fall of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, the Cory Aquino administration 
resumed the accord that resulted in the signing of the Jeddah Accord in January 1987.91 This 
led to the signing into law of the establishment of the ARMM on August 1, 1989.92 Under 
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the Ramos administration, the MNLF signed the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) with the 
Philippine government in September 2, 1996, which led to the end of armed conflicts between 
the security forces and MNLF and the creation of development of special zones in 14 
provinces in Mindanao, including Palawan.93 President Fidel Ramos supported Misuari who 
was elected as ARMM governor and was given the authority to implement development 
efforts in Mindanao. 
As the popularity of Misuari and MNLF declined due to organizational problems, the 
group was sidelined to further peace negotiations with the Philippine government, leading to 
sporadic attacks and violence, and thus creating instability again in the region.94 In 2001, 
when Misuari failed to be reelected as ARMM governor, he organized the Misuari Breakaway 
Group (MBG) with its operations mainly in Sulu province and other parts of the Zamboanga 
peninsula.95 On February 6, 2005, MBG rebels spontaneously attacked several army camps 
in Sulu, which resulted in 30 soldiers killed and about 35,000 civilians displaced.96 In 2013, 
the MBG attacked Zamboanga City (often called the Zamboanga Siege), which resulted in 
the death of 19 soldiers and 208 MBG members, and displaced 24,000 people.97 Misuari 
accused the Aquino administration of betraying the FPA signed in 1996.98 Through the years, 
Misuari continued to engage the government in political activities. In 2016, President Rodrigo 
Duterte granted Misuari immunity from arrest and he was designated as the Philippine 
representative to the Islamic Conference.99 The present position of Misuari gives the MNLF 
a role to play in the ongoing peace process launched by the Duterte administration with other 
Islamist groups like the MILF. 
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2. Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
The MILF is a splinter group of the MNLF that is “more religiously oriented than the 
nationalist and secular orientation of the MNLF.”100 The MILF was established by Salamat 
Hashim, a high-ranking MNLF commander who had a disagreement with the MNLF 
leadership in 1983.101 The majority of the group were Maguindanaons, a major Muslim 
ethnic tribe that mainly operates in Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur and other parts of western 
Mindanao.102 The main political aspiration of the MILF is the creation of a sole “Islamic 
State known as the Mindanao Islamic Republic (MIR)” that will have its own government 
implementing shariah (Islamic law) to all the Muslims in southern Philippines.103  
Aside from fighting with government forces after its inception, some members of the 
MILF participated and trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan with financial support from 
Middle Eastern countries.104 It was during this interaction that MILF fighters worked together 
with the terrorist group Al-Qaeda.105 In the 1990s, Osama Bin Laden financially supported 
the MILF through a charitable organization named International Islamic Relief Organization 
(IRRO).106 Al-Qaeda then used the Philippines as a base to support Southeast Asian terrorist 
groups like the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which perpetrated the 2002 Bali bombings in 
Indonesia.107 Furthermore, the MILF also established links with other local terrorist groups 
like ASG and the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM) in joint training and operations against 
government forces.108 In 1999, the AFP assessed the MILF’s strength to be about 20,000 
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members, making it the largest rebel group and outnumbering the MNLF, prompting the 
government to negotiate.109  
President Ramos initiated negotiations and explored terms with the MILF, including 
the cessation of hostilities.110 Nonetheless, during the term of President Joseph Estrada, 
negotiations broke off and the MILF engaged in armed clashes with government forces.111 
On 2001, when Gloria M. Arroyo became the president, peace talks resumed with the MILF 
reversing the all-out war of President Estrada.112 After President Arroyo, the peace 
negotiations gained momentum during the subsequent Aquino administration and resulted in 
the establishment of an “autonomous political entity called the Bangsamoro Autonomous 
Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM),” replacing the ARMM. While the creation of 
BARMM was rejected by other provinces, the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on 
the Bangsamoro (CAB) was still formalized in March 2014.113 At present, the Duterte 
administration has continued the normalization phase and decommissioning of MILF 
members supervised by the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) as stated in the 
BARMM organic law.114 The MILF claims, however, that it still has 40,000 fighters and 
7,000 firearms for decommissioning.115 Moreover, when the MILF began its peace 
negotiation with the government, new splinter groups emerged to oppose the peace process.  
3. Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters 
The BIFF is a MILF breakaway group founded by one of MILF’s military leaders, 
Ameril Umbra Kato.116 He studied in Saudi Arabia where he learned Wahhabism and aimed 
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at an independent Muslim state as the MILF became “more amenable to autonomy, instead 
of independence,” for the Bangsamoro people.117 The group generally covers the provinces 
of Maguindanao and North Cotabato where Kato and his group came from.118 With the death 
of Kato in April 2015, the group was divided into three groups led by Karialan, Bungos, and 
Abu Toraife.119 Estimates of these militant groups’ numbers vary. In 2018, the AFP estimated 
Toraife’s group to be between 60 to 100, while the other factions totaled over 250 BIFF 
fighters.120 Despite the small numbers in each faction, these subgroups of BIFF continue to 
conduct violence and act as spoilers disrupting military operations, thus affecting the MILF’s 
peace negotiations with the government. 
Despite continuous military operations, the BIFF factions have carried out atrocities 
and terror attacks in central Mindanao in recent years. They carried out sporadic attacks on 
Christian communities and military camps, undermining the peace talks between the 
government and the MILF.121 In 2012, BIFF rebels attacked 11 communities in Maguindanao 
prior to the resumption of the planned negotiations.122 Likewise, in 2014, some BIFF 
members supported the IS, a move that was seen by the military as a means to gain recognition 
of their group.123 Moreover, a series of bombings and attacks against government forces and 
civilians in central Mindanao were widely attributed to the BIFF. On January 25, 2015, the 
BIFF, together with the MILF and other armed groups, attacked the Philippine National Police 
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Special Action Force (PNP-SAF), where 44 of its members died in the military encounter.124 
Because some MILF members were involved in attacking the policemen, the MILF-
Philippine government peace process received backlash.125 On December 31, 2018, the date 
of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) referendum, a bombing in Cotabato City occurred 
that resulted in the death of two and wounded 32 people; security forces believed that BIFF 
was behind the attack.126 The BIFF has continued to conduct atrocities and attacks especially 
in Christian communities to undermine and derail the ongoing MILF-Philippine government 
peace talks. 
 
4. Abu Sayaff Group 
The ASG is a splinter group from MNLF, founded in 1991 by one of its members, 
Abdurajak Janjalani.127 The group has aimed for a separate Islamic state in Mindanao.128 It 
is believed that Janjalani may have been influenced during his travel as a mujahedeen in the 
Middle East during the Afghan war.129 It was also during this time that Janjalani gained 
monetary and logistical support for the newly created terrorist group.130 Janjalani recruited 
other disenfranchised MNLF members who shared the ASG’s “radical views” that differed 
from those of its mother unit.131 Furthermore, with its link to the Al-Qaeda, the ASG gained 
not only funding through charitable organizations but also training, especially in bomb 
making.132  
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Due to its brutality and violence, the ASG caught the attention of not only the local 
but also the international community. In 1997, the ASG was listed by the United States as a 
Foreign Terrorist Organization in South East Asia, together with Al-Qaeda and JI.133 The 
group not only wages war with government forces but also engages in extreme violence 
against innocent civilians. Aside from bombings, the ASG also kidnaps for ransom to finance 
its operations. Most notable were the April 23, 2000 Sipadan kidnapping incident in Malaysia 
and the May 28, 2001 Dos Palmas Resort kidnapping in Palawan, where foreign and Filipino 
tourists were kidnapped for ransom.134 Moreover, the ASG has also perpetrated high-fatality 
bombings, including the 2004 MV Super Ferry 14 attack where 116 civilians died at sea.135 
In April 2017, an ASG faction under Isnilon Hapilon (IH), the ISIS designated Emir in South 
East Asia, pledged allegiance to ISIS and along with the Maute group and a faction from the 
BIFF attacked Marawi City.  
5. Maute/IS Lanao del Sur Group 
Brothers Omar and Abdullah Maute, from Butig, Lanao del Sur, founded an ISIS 
inspired terrorist group, the Maute group, or the IS Lanao del Sur group. They both reportedly 
held senior positions in the MILF and broke away following disagreements about the MILF’s 
negotiation with the government.136 The group has sought to “build an ‘Islamic’ society and 
mini-state in Lanao Del Sur.”137 The Maute brothers were able to study abroad in the Middle 
East, where they are believed to have been radicalized.138 The Maute group was able to recruit 
young Muslims with the promise of monetary incentives for their families, ideological 
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indoctrination, and paramilitary training in Butig.139 The Maute group was able also to recruit 
former members of the MILF through their extended families.140 The group gained further 
traction in 2016 when the ISIS called its fighters to travel to the Philippines instead of the 
Middle East (Iraq and Syria) to fulfill their jihad.141  
On May 23, 2017, the Maute/IS group together with the ASG (led by IH) and foreign 
fighters seized the only Islamic City of Marawi, where a majority of the population is Muslim, 
prompting the Philippine government to launch a massive counterattack against the group. 
Adopting the manner of ISIS, the Maute Group burned the Catholic Church and schools and 
took hostages. During the siege, the combined terrorist groups used modern technologies in 
support of their operations. The groups used accurate sniper rifles and improvised explosive 
devices (IED), drones for monitoring the battle area, and cellular phones and radio for 
communication and propaganda. After five months, the group of terrorists was defeated on 
October 16, 2017, following the death of Hapilon and Omar Maute, ending the siege. The 
remaining members of the group splintered into smaller groups in different parts of Mindanao. 
Although the Maute group lost militarily in Marawi, the group was able to influence 
others: the battle of Marawi and the resulting damage to and ruins of the city center, houses, 
and mosques, and the death of its fighters were used heavily in the group’s narratives in 
recruitment and propaganda.142 The Maute copied their strategies from those of ISIS in Iraq 
and Syria, shifting to suicide bombings against government forces and civilians.143 More 
recently, the ISIS-inspired group has claimed attacks and suicide bombings at a paramilitary 
checkpoint in Basilan that killed ten people (July 2018); at Jolo Cathedral (Sulu), accounting 
for 23 deaths and 102 wounded (January 27, 2019); a Jolo bombing perpetrated by the first 
Filipino suicide bomber, killing eight and wounding at least 20 (June 28, 2019); and suicide 
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bombing at an army camp in Sulu (September 8, 2019).144 The emergence of the ISIS-
inspired Maute group made suicide bombings a more common tactics of terror attack in the 
country.145 
 
B. PATTERNS AND TRENDS 
Dating back to the early 1970s, the Moro movement in Mindanao is one of the 
“world’s longest-running insurgencies.”146 The conflict has claimed the lives of more than 
120,000 and displaced more than two million people.147 Violence and terrorism persist as the 
different Islamist groups have evolved over time. These groups continue to demonstrate their 
adaptability and resiliency in the changing political and security landscape in the country. The 
ability of these groups to adapt can be seen in their respective ideologies, strategies, and 
tactics, and the support system that they developed in response in pursuit of their political and 
religious goals.  
In terms of ideologies, each Islamist group differs from the others depending on its 
motivations and the period when the group was created. The creation of the nationalist-driven 
MNLF came after the alleged abuse of Muslims during the Marcos regime, especially after 
the alleged Jabidah massacre148 that became the focal point for Moro separatists. On the 
other hand, the MILF and the ASG, both splinter groups of the MNLF, espouse Islamic 
principles and teachings like shariah rather than the secular orientation of the MNLF. 
Likewise, the BIFF and the Maute group, both splinter groups of the MILF, seek to create an 
Islamic state in the southern Philippines. The differences in their leadership and motivations 
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have led to the creation of smaller splinter groups that have become a pattern in Muslim 
insurgency (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Different Islamist Splinter Groups in Mindanao149  
Aside from differences in ideologies, the creation of new factions can also be 
attributed to the education and experiences of the leaders as well as the factionalization of 
ethnic groups. All the Moro separatist leaders except for Misuari had education and 
interactions in other parts of the Muslim world. Hashim Salamat attended a bachelor’s degree 
program in Cairo, Egypt; Kato studied in Saudi Arabia where he was exposed to Wahhabism; 
Janjalani fought during the Afghan war alongside other mujahidin; and the Maute brothers 
studied abroad in the Middle East. Their experiences and education in Islamic countries 
certainly influenced and may have radicalized them, enabling them to form their own groups. 
Moreover, the leaders’ ethnic identities also contributed to the formation of different splinter 
groups. Misuari, a Tausug from Sulu, drew his main forces from Sulu; Salamat from 
Maguindanao was supported by Maranaos and Maguindanaons; Kato from North Cotabato 
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mainly operated in Central Mindanao; Janjalani, a Yakan, has drawn main members from 
Basilan and Sulu; and the Maute brothers had their group in Marawi City and Butig, Lanao 
del Sur, where they came from. The factionalization of ethnic groups has been a determinant 
for the creation of different insurgent groups and the locations where they generally operate 
(see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Muslim Ethnic Groups in Mindanao150 
In pursuit of their respective goals, the different Islamist groups have developed their 
own strategies and tactics in response to the government. After long years of armed 
confrontations with the Philippine security forces, the MNLF and the MILF have opted to 
enter peace negotiations with the government through different legal frameworks. 
Negotiations have covered the groups’ different social issues and grievances such as: 
“ancestral domain, displaced and landless Bangsamoro, destruction of property, war victims, 
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human rights issues, social and cultural corruption, economic, and widespread poverty.”151 
Meanwhile, the BIFF, ASG, and the Maute/ISIS group have continued conducting terror 
attacks rather than negotiation in pursuit of their goals. The BIFF has continued to attack 
military targets and the Christian community, in particular, to undermine the peace 
negotiations between the government and the MILF.152 The ASG, in addition to bombings 
and other terror activities, has resorted to kidnap for ransom and extortion to support its 
operations. Moreover, aside from the bloody Marawi Siege, the Maute/IS group has supported 
suicide bombings in collaboration with foreign fighters, inflicting more casualties in the 
province of Sulu.  
In addition to local support, the different Islamist groups have external support coming 
from other Islamic countries and organizations in the Middle East. The MNLF has had the 
backing of the OIC and Libya in pursuing the peace process with the government. The MILF 
and the ASG, with its link to Al-Qaeda, have received financial support through various front 
Islamic organizations in the Philippines like the IRRO. This funding has facilitated training 
and terrorist operations such as bombings in different parts of the country.153 Similarly, the 
BIFF and the Maute/IS group, aside from their local area support, have received support from 
the ISIS to finance their operations. This support enabled the Maute/IS group and factions of 
BIFF and ASG to conduct training and then launch the 2017 Marawi siege.  
The creation of smaller factions has become a trend where they splinter frequently in 
pursuit of goals that will benefit certain leaders and ethnic groups. Factionalization among 
different Muslim ethnic groups shows their distinct cultural differences and disunity despite 
all of them being Muslims, which further hinders autonomy in Mindanao. This can be 
demonstrated when the MILF (composed mainly of members the Maguindanao ethnic group) 
broke away from the MNLF, who are mostly Tausug from Sulu.154 Recently, ISIS-aligned 
ASG, the Maute group, and BIFF have also emerged as extremist groups, each having 
 
151 Rasul, “Radicalization of Muslims in Mindanao,” 28. 
152 Rhoades and Helmus, “Countering Violent Extremism in the Philippines,” 2020. 
153 Banlaoi, Philippine Security in the Age of Terror, 2009, 54. 
154 May, “History, Demography and Factionalism: Obstacles to Conflict Resolution through 
Autonomy in the Southern Philippines,” 281. 
34 
different goals that may sabotage and spoil the peace process. Furthermore, factionalization 
was seen during the plebiscites when not all Muslim communities were in favor of the 
autonomous region. For example, during the last 2019 BARMM plebiscite, the province of 
Sulu and other Muslim barangays voted against the new autonomous region. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Although the different Islamist groups vary in their ideologies, motivations, and 
strategies, they share certain overarching political goals, except for the MNLF and MILF: to 
“expel the Christian majority from Mindanao and establish an autonomous Islamic state for 
Filipino Muslims.”155 Though the groups splinter frequently, they occasionally converge in 
tactical alliance, especially against a common enemy (like the government), or if it concerns 
the Islamic faith.156 The recent terrorist attacks—such as the 2017 Marawi Siege—clearly 
demonstrate the possibility that the various ethnic groups, despite their differences, can join 
forces against a common enemy. Notably, the Maute-ISIS-ASG coalition has transcended 
clans and ethnic factions bringing together Tausug, Maranao, and Maguindanao to fight 
government forces.157 Furthermore, the recent suicide bombings demonstrate coordination 
among small autonomous groups and cells making bombing less predictable, more lethal, and 
more frequent, enabling the terrorist groups to inflict maximum casualties.158 Islamist groups 
have evolved from insurgent groups to extremist groups engaging in violent tactics like 
suicide bombing that present new challenges to the Philippine government.159 The evolution 
and adaptability of these groups have been proven through time; they were able to survive 
despite the government’s actions, requiring deep analysis of the government’s 
counterterrorism approaches and responses. 
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IV. PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO TERRORISM 
The Philippines has been fighting the Moro insurgency for more than five decades, 
yet recent terrorist incidents and armed conflicts in Mindanao have shown that peace and 
stability are still out of reach. The 2017 Marawi Siege and the recent series of suicide 
bombings in the Sulu province are indicators that the government’s strategy and 
approaches may have made political progress with the BARMM, but are not sufficient 
against the evolving terrorist threat in the Philippines. Despite the numerous and varied 
counterterrorism (CT) efforts of the government, different Islamist groups continue to 
emerge and conduct terrorist activities. Moreover, existing terrorist groups continue to 
evolve and form splinter groups that add challenges to the CT efforts. Although the 
government has been continuously implementing different CT strategies, they have fallen 
short in addressing the problem, requiring a closer examination of the effectiveness of these 
strategies in addressing the persistent and evolving challenge of terrorism. The various 
Philippine government responses include military and policing approaches, countering 
violent extremism (CVE) programs, improvement of pertinent laws and policies on 
terrorism, and security cooperation with other countries.  
A. MILITARY APPROACH 
The counterterrorism strategies of the Philippines against terrorism and extremism 
have been characterized mainly by strong military responses.160 These responses can be 
traced from the colonial period up to the different administrations of the Republic of the 
Philippines. In the process of colonizing Mindanao, the Spaniards with the support of 
Christian Filipino converts were resisted by the Muslims.161 Likewise during the American 
occupation (1899–1946), just as with the Spaniards, the United States met with armed 
resistance from the Muslims, making the conflicts more extreme as the Muslims refused to 
be conquered. Since independence in 1946, due to political and economic deprivation, as 
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well as the marginalization and abuse of Muslims, violent confrontation and conflict 
between the Muslim population and the government has continued.  
Different administrations of the Philippines generally have different military 
approaches and strategies when dealing with the many Islamist groups, demonstrating non-
continuity of counterterrorism efforts. On September 21, 1972, for example, President 
Ferdinand Marcos declared Martial Law to address the spread of communism and 
insurgency in the country.162 In response to military rule, Muslims waged an armed 
struggle and demanded the Marcos administration to recognize a separate independent state 
of Mindanao.163 From 1972 to 1976, casualties both from the military and the civilian side 
reached 120,000 and resulted in about one million internally displaced individuals.164 Due 
to the recognition of the MNLF and diplomatic pressures from the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC), Marcos was forced to open negotiations between the group and the 
government.165 Although the peace talks with the MNLF continued under President 
Corazon Aquino, her administration faced the new secessionist MILF group in Central 
Mindanao. Trends of lethal incidents from the Philippine Army records, which track 
incidents that resulted in at least one death either from the government or enemy in the 
Philippines, have highlighted that during the Ramos Administration (1992–1998) terrorist 
and lethal incidents ebbed (see Figure 6). The low number of recorded lethal incidents, 
particularly in 1994–1998, can be attributed to the signing of the Final Peace Agreement 
between the MNLF and the Philippine government in 1996. 
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Figure 6. Trend in the Lethal Incidents from 1975–2012166 
Nevertheless, due to continued attacks by the MILF and other extremist groups like 
the ASG, President Joseph Estrada declared a “Total War Policy” in 2000 against the 
Islamist groups, which resulted in the suspension of the peace talks and massive armed 
confrontations.167 After President Estrada was ousted in 2001, President Gloria Macapagal 
Arroyo declared a “unilateral ceasefire and initiated exploratory talks” with the MILF that 
resulted in the signing of the 2001 Tripoli Peace Agreement, signaling peace negotiations 
with the MILF.168 With the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and the stalemate in 
peace negotiations with the MILF, however, the Arroyo administration increased 
counterterrorism operations against different groups.169 From 2000 to 2008, a resurgence 
in lethal incidents was largely brought about by an increase in both CT operations and 
terrorist activities (see Figure 7). 
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The heavy-handed military approaches by these two administrations clearly did not 
prevent terrorists from conducting their operations; hence, new extremist groups have 
continued to emerge and terrorist attacks have persisted not only during the Aquino (2010–
2016) administration but into the Duterte (2016–present) administration. Data from the 
START Global Terrorism Database indicates that terrorist attacks continue despite strong 
military approaches by the government (see Figure 7). 
  
Figure 7. Terrorist Attacks in the Philippines by Perpetrator, 2001–
2017170 
The policy of unrelenting military operations against extremist groups continued 
during the Aquino administration. In 2013, the Misuari Breakaway Group (MBG) or the 
MNLF Rouge elements assaulted Zamboanga City for the reason that they were not 
consulted in the ongoing peace process, voiding their 1996 FPA with the government.171 
Meanwhile, the CT operations also continued against different groups targeting high value 
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targets in different parts of Mindanao during the Aquino administration. In early January 
2015, the approved Oplan Exodus targeting Malaysian explosives expert Zulkifli Bin Hir, 
alias Marwan, and Filipino bomb maker Ahmad Batabol Usman, resulted in the deaths of 
44 PNP-SAF troopers.172 The incident, often called the Mamasapano incident, has 
triggered strong anti-Muslim messages that have affected the ongoing peace process with 
the MILF.173 Furthermore, the Mamasapano tragedy also raised doubts about the 
capabilities of security forces for future CT operations, which were again put to the test 
during the Marawi Siege in 2017 during the Duterte administration. The five-month-long 
crisis exposed the need for the military and the government to assess their readiness and 
strategies. Although the five-month heavy military approach was considered a tactical 
victory, others focused on the resulting wide destruction of infrastructure and the numerous 
deaths and the displacement of innocent civilians. The aftermath of the siege brought 
negative sentiments directed especially at the rehabilitation effort, which played into the 
militant narratives for recruiting future members and actions of extremist groups.174 This 
was followed by suicide bombing attacks in Mindanao perpetrated by ASG and other IS 
affiliated groups a few months after the Marawi crisis. 
B. COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM PROGRAMS 
The Philippine government has also continued to advocate different CVE programs 
aside from military approaches that aim to address the common drivers of terrorism. These 
programs, run by government agencies and NGOs, are focused on bringing basic 
government social services to vulnerable communities, thus addressing the grievances and 
causes of conflict being exploited by terrorist groups. The Philippine government’s CVE 
strategy is part of an all-of-government approach in which government agencies and 
stakeholders plan and execute various CVE programs. 
The most significant CVE program is the peace process between the government 
and the secessionist groups to end the conflict. This initiative started with the MNLF and 
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followed with the MILF. The peace talks with the MNLF that culminated in the signing of 
the FPA resulted in the creation of the ARMM and ended the conflict with the MNLF.175 
Likewise, in 2014, the government and the MILF signed the CAB, detailing the roadmap 
for peace deals with the MILF.176 Importantly, the peace negotiations are the avenue 
through which the government can address some of the core grievances of the MILF and 
MNLF. Specifically, the peace talks with the two biggest groups resulted in the creation of 
an autonomous region for Muslim leaders to govern in coordination with the national 
government. In order to address and sustain the gains with these groups, the government 
launched capacity-building and development initiatives like the Payapa at Masaganang 
Pamayanan or the PAMANA program. The Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace 
Process (OPAPP) runs the said program with the objectives to “reduce push factors for 
radicalization by improving governance on the national and local levels reducing poverty 
and improving delivery of basic social services and empowering communities to mediate 
conflicts and broker peace by strengthening social cohesion.”177 PAMANA has launched 
programs that provide protection for those ex-fighters who returned to the fold of the 
law.178  
Other significant CVEs include various social and educational initiatives with the 
goal to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Moros and the whole community, including the 
Christian Filipinos. The purpose of these activities is to bring education and cooperation 
among Christians and Muslims about CVE programs.179 These activities are usually done 
with the help of interfaith religious organizations like the Bishop-Ulama Conference and 
different NGOs.180 Likewise, other programs are continuously being conducted and 
facilitated by the AFP to increase interactions among different sectors of the society. This 
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highlights the role of the AFP as “an active partner of the LGUs, government line agencies, 
and other stakeholders in different peace initiatives, socio-economic programs, civic 
works, engineering projects, and other development-related activities.”181 The Civil 
Military Operations (CMO) units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines runs various 
initiatives dedicated to stakeholder engagement, community awareness on CVE, and 
deradicalization efforts supporting the AFP campaign plan—Development Support and 
Security Plan “Kapayapaan.”182 Nonetheless, despite the massive effort, time, and cost, 
CVE efforts have failed to eliminate terrorism in Mindanao. 
The CVE programs, implemented by different government agencies and private 
and social organizations, lack synchronization and unification of efforts in addressing 
terrorism and extremism, especially in the Muslim communities. According to RAND, 
CVE is weakened as “poor coordination, lack of information sharing, and unclear division 
of responsibilities lead to duplicative or conflicting efforts when multiple agencies are 
engaged in counterterrorism and CVE efforts, as they are in the Philippines.”183 Local 
government units and private institutions have their own programs in parallel to those of 
the AFP and PNP, creating redundancy of efforts and resources. Moreover, there are 
reports of corruption, where municipal and town officials use CVE funds for non-CVE 
related activities.184 Moreover, the Philippine government CVE programs may have 
different messaging and interpretation of Muslim ideologies, intensifying tensions between 
Muslim and Christian communities.185 Likewise, a 2013 perception survey conducted by 
the Asia Foundation showed that “trust level in the AFP is much lower in the ARMM 
provinces like Lanao del Sur with only 34% of respondents trust the military as compared 
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to 59.6% in the provinces outside the ARMM.”186 This survey’s results indicated that 
government needs to evaluate the CVE programs and other CT strategies in addressing 
terrorism and violent extremism (see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Satisfaction with National Government Provision of 
Security and Justice187 
C. COUNTERTERRORISM LAWS AND POLICIES  
Aside from the military approaches and CVE efforts, the Philippine government 
formulated pertinent laws and actions to address the emerging threat of terrorism in the 
country. As Zachary Abuza mentions, “the impact of 9/11 on the Philippines and other 
Southeast Asian governments was enormous, forcing them to confront a radically changed 
security environment.”188 The 9/11 incident prompted the Philippine government to come 
up with policies and agencies to address the new threat of terrorism. On September 24, 
2001, the Inter-Agency Task Force against International Terrorism was created to 
 
186 Fermin Adriano and Thomas I. Parks, “The Contested Corners of Asia: The Case of Mindanao , 
Philippines” (San Francisco, CA: The Asia Foundation, 2013), https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/
MindanaoCaseStudyFullReport.pdf. 
187 Source: Adriano and Parks. 
188 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2003), 2. 
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coordinate intelligence and CT operations targeting terrorist groups in the Philippines.189 
Likewise, on November 12, 2001, the Philippine Congress passed the Anti-Money 
Laundering Act to freeze the financial assets of terrorist organizations.190 The government 
also drafted the National Plan to Address Terrorism and its Consequences, as part of the 
National Internal Security Plan (NISP) dated November 26, 2001, to proscribe and abhor 
violence and terrorism committed by any group in pursuit of any criminal or political 
goal.191 The different policies and the increasing threat of terrorism subsequently led to 
laws that aim to prosecute terrorists and aid in CT operations.  
The first law specifically addressing counterterrorism, which came six years after 
9/11, is the Republic Act 9372, also known as the Human Security Act (HSA) of 2007, and 
is titled “An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism.” The HSA 
“criminalizes and defines terrorism and other relevant terms, stipulates regulations for 
surveillance, and includes provisions for countering terrorist efforts.”192 However, the 
effectiveness and the implementation of the law were questioned by various sectors. 
Senator Panfilo Lacson described the HSA of 2007 as a “dead letter law” that was rarely 
used.193 In fact, despite the many terrorism incidents, only one person was convicted under 
the law. The law is problematic in its enforceability and includes many restrictions on law 
enforcement. For one, an acquittal of the accused will entitle him to damages in the amount 
of P 500,000 for every day that he has been detained, chargeable against the agency that 
sanctioned the filing of the case, a provision that inhibits filing new cases.194 The law was 
not used to charge a terrorist until a judicial court convicted a Maute group member in 
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November 2018.195 Despite some perceived deficiencies of the law, it helped to form the 
Anti-Terrorism Council to ensure that the HSA is properly implemented.196 Generally, the 
HSA has not been widely utilized as an instrument for the government and especially for 
law enforcement agencies to prosecute terrorists. As a result, the Duterte administration 
came up with its own law. 
Senate Bill No. 2204, or the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2019, was enacted to replace 
the HSA. The new bill arguably corrected deficiencies by penalizing (a) any person who 
will travel or attempt to travel for the purpose of planning, preparing, or committing acts 
of terrorism; (b) any person who organizes or facilitates the travel; and (c) any person 
residing abroad who comes for training, planning, preparing to participate in terrorism or 
providing support.197 At present, several sectors have filed petitions against the 
implementation of the law since it is potentially open to abuse by security forces. The 
effectiveness of this new law against terrorism cannot be certain since it is not fully 
implemented, awaiting a final decision by the Supreme Court.  
D. SECURITY COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES  
The 9/11 terror attacks and the Bali bombing198 prompted the Philippines to lay 
out a comprehensive set of strategies for addressing terrorism that includes security 
cooperation with other countries. Given incidents in Indonesia and the Philippines, 
Southeast Asia has been regarded as the “second front in the war on terror.”199 The 9/11 
and other terrorist attacks changed the perception of leaders in the Philippines and other 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries so that terrorism was more 
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than a local issue but an actual threat in need of a regional security focus.200 These events, 
which include persisting terrorist incidents in the Philippines, especially in Mindanao, 
prompted the government to seek security cooperation with ASEAN countries and other 
external partners. 
Recognizing that terrorism spans international boundaries, the Philippines has 
fostered security cooperation with its ASEAN neighbors. Though this cooperation has 
weaknesses, it helps address terrorism in the region. ASEAN’s early response to terrorism 
lacked a coordinated response, which derives from differences in individual states’ levels 
of threat, resources, security forces capabilities, and other factors that limit collaborations 
among members.201 Despite these initial weaknesses, ASEAN security cooperation has 
gradually improved, moving towards bilateral and regional cooperation to address the 
challenge. Security cooperation established among ASEAN members includes 
“intelligence sharing, joint anti-terrorism exercises, and combined operations.”202 Joint 
patrols within the region have also occurred as a result of regional security cooperation. 
Joint sea patrols include the Trilateral Maritime Patrol by Indonesia, Philippines, and 
Malaysia, addressing the sea lanes between these countries, which usually serve as 
traditional routes of terrorists and other transnational crime groups.203 This cooperation 
has led to numerous arrests of JI network leaders and members, thwarting future terror 
attacks in the region.204 The Philippines, together with other ASEAN countries, has 
gradually broadened the capability and the capacity of government and security forces to 
counter terrorism. 
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Aside from ASEAN’s regional response to terrorism, assistance from external 
partners has contributed to a more focused effort addressing the causes of terrorism in the 
region. Assistance and aid packages from the United States have enhanced 
counterterrorism capabilities of the Philippines.205 In February 2002, the Philippines and 
the United States launched the Balikatan exercises where Filipino soldiers received training 
and equipment on special operations, night fighting capability, maritime operations and 
CMO, all of which enhanced its CT capabilities.206 Through this mutual relationship, with 
U.S. assistance, the Philippines’ CT efforts have made significant progress against several 
terrorist groups, especially the ASG.207 Other countries, such as those in the European 
Union (EU), Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, and South Korea have 
also helped the Philippines and other ASEAN countries in CT efforts.208 Multilateral 
cooperation encompasses “joint exercises, information sharing, and enhancing force 
capabilities” to include humanitarian operations.209 Western states have proved crucial in 
providing security assistance in the field of intelligence, training, funding, and capability 
build-up to achieve counterterrorism objectives.210 The security assistance and 
cooperation between the Philippines and other countries fluctuates, but has greatly 
contributed in developing CT capabilities and overcoming the challenges of terrorism. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Despite the efforts of the Philippine government, the threat of terrorism remains. 
This can be attributed to a number of factors, including a lack of continuity and 
coordination among government and private institutions. Counterterrorism strategies of 
succeeding administrations lack continuity since every administration has its own approach 
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to CT and its own priorities in addressing the various Islamist groups in the country. The 
Ramos administration, as compared to other administrations, significantly contributed to 
peace efforts with the MNLF and MILF, while the subsequent Estrada administration 
implemented a different approach, the all-out-war policy, which eroded the gains of the 
peace process; hence, it led to armed conflict and violence in Mindanao. Moreover, the 
increase in CT operations under the administrations of Arroyo through Duterte has led to 
“ups and downs” in countering terrorism since each administration differs in its CT policies 
and strategies. The intensive military operations have prompted criticisms about this 
approach against the Muslim communities and has added to the radicalization of vulnerable 
individuals.211 Likewise, CVE programs lack interagency coordination, which is a 
hindrance in addressing the drivers of terrorism. In addition, the 2007 HSA was seen 
ineffective and the new 2019 Anti-Terrorism Bill has yet to be tested in aiding 
government’s efforts in prosecuting terrorists. At the same time, security cooperation with 
other countries has helped the overall CT efforts of the Philippines, but it has contributed 
only to limited success due to differences in the CT policies, experience, and resources 
among nations. These various government responses, although gaining positive results in 
neutralizing terrorist activities and mitigating the drivers of radicalization, need continuous 
assessment where the political and security landscapes in Mindanao continue to evolve. 
This entails sustainable and comprehensive strategies and actions that will complement 
ongoing government responses to comprehensively address terrorism and bring peace in 
Mindanao. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The persistence of terrorism and violence in Mindanao remains a critical security 
challenge of the Philippines. This is despite the government’s efforts to counter and 
eradicate the danger, especially in the southern Philippines. The Philippine government has 
been fighting Muslim insurgencies and terrorism for more than five decades and still falls 
short in addressing the problem. These challenges have resulted in the loss of many lives 
and damage to many properties, which greatly affects the stability and security of the 
country. Therefore, this thesis explored why the violence persists despite government 
counterterrorism efforts. Understanding the root causes and drivers of terrorism in 
Mindanao may help the government develop novel, comprehensive, and sustainable 
strategies and actions. This thesis concludes with recommendations to complement 
ongoing government responses to terrorism and ultimately bring peace in Mindanao. 
A. FINDINGS 
The persisting threat of terrorism and violence in Mindanao can be attributed to 
different factors. These factors developed over time and have contributed to the present 
security and political landscape, driving persistent terrorism. The following paragraphs 
summarize the different findings generated by this thesis.  
1. Terrorism and Armed Conflicts in Mindanao Are Multifaceted and 
Deeply Rooted  
Understanding the history of Moros and their four centuries of struggle reveals how 
events have shaped their identity and how conflicts and violence have evolved over time. 
It was their struggle against successive foreign colonizers and later their perceived 
marginalization caused by Filipino Christians that made Muslims feel that their culture, 
values, tradition, and religion were being threatened. The rapid migrations of Christians 
from Luzon and the Visayas to the south also paved the way in creating gaps and tensions 
between Christians and Muslims. During the post-colonial period, Christians took control 
of the land, economy, and government in Mindanao, which economically and politically 
deprived the Muslims who were formerly the majority habitants and leaders in Mindanao. 
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In addition, widespread poverty and economic hardships, lack of education and 
opportunity, and other grievances have been ongoing themes in the narratives of the Moro 
cause. These grievances paved the way to the formation of various Islamist groups aiming 
for the establishment of an independent Islamic state led and governed by the Moro people. 
2. Islamist Secessionist Groups Continue to Form Splinter Groups 
Factionalization among Islamist groups continues to occur due to differences in 
leadership, motivations, and ethnic populations among Muslim community in Mindanao. 
After the alleged Jabidah massacre, which became the focal point of Moro separatists, the 
rise of Islamist groups started with the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front. 
Not long after, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group split from the 
MNLF because of differences in leadership, motivations, and ideologies. This 
factionalization also gave way to the establishment of more radical groups like the BIFF 
and the Maute/Islamic State groups, which all splintered from the MILF. Factionalization 
among various Muslim ethnic groups and the “break-away” cycle show their distinct 
cultural differences, interests, and disunity despite all of them being Muslims fighting for 
the independence and separation of Mindanao. Factionalization further hinders peace 
negotiations and autonomy in Mindanao, thus hampering development and stability in the 
region. 
3. Terrorist Groups Continue to Adapt to the Changing Political and 
Security Landscape 
Islamist groups continue to exhibit their adaptability and resilience despite the 
government’s continuous effort to address terrorism in the country. They have evolved 
from insurgent groups into extremist groups that engage in violent tactics such as 
kidnapping for ransom and bombings, giving additional challenges to the security forces. 
Although the MNLF and the MILF engaged with the government in peace negotiations and 
secured limited autonomy for Mindanao, sporadic attacks from other groups have 
continued to inflict casualties and damage properties, evading counterterrorism operations 
and legal prosecution. The 2007 Human Security Act was not effective in aiding CT 
approaches and prosecuting terrorists. Likewise, the new Anti-Terror Bill has yet to be 
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tested after legal battles in the Supreme Court. Moreover, the terrorists’ resiliency can also 
be attributed to the education and experience of their leaders and members, as well as the 
financial, logistical, and training support they receive from other international terrorist 
groups like Al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. 
4. The Emergence of the ISIS-affiliated Groups and the 2017 Marawi 
Siege Demonstrated New Ideologies, Tactics, and Challenges  
ISIS has greatly influenced and unified different Islamist groups in Mindanao. The 
2017 Marawi Siege showed that despite factionalization, with ISIS ideology and influence, 
it is possible for different ethnic groups, with the aid of foreign terrorist fighters, to work 
together. This unification was exhibited during the Marawi Siege where different Islamist 
groups held the city for five months using IEDs, sniper fire, hostage taking, and urban 
fighting tactics, which were also new to most of the security forces. With its attack in the 
city, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) faced new challenges in fighting terrorists 
on urban terrain as compared to the usual jungle environment. Furthermore, ISIS influence 
also paved the way for the adoption of another new tactic: suicide bombs utilizing both 
Moro Muslims and foreign nationals to attack civilians and military targets. These new 
tactics and evolving ideologies have been more difficult for the security forces to detect, 
monitor, and address. 
5. The Government Response Falls Short in Addressing Terrorism in 
Mindanao 
The government has continued to address but has failed to resolve the persistence 
of terrorism despite numerous CT policies and efforts. One reason for the lack of success 
is that successive administrations of the Philippines have adopted divergent and sometime 
contradictory approaches to counterterrorism as well as different priorities in addressing 
Islamist groups in the country. Moreover, the various CT and CVE programs have also 
lacked synchronization and unification of effort among the security sector, non-
government organizations (NGOs), and other government agencies in the implementation 
of these initiatives. The government response lacks inter-agency coordination. In addition, 
anti-terrorism policies and pertinent laws are not enough to prosecute terrorists due to 
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loopholes in the laws and policies. Furthermore, security cooperation with other countries 
has only contributed limited success due to differences in counterterrorism policies, 
resources, and experience. Although these government responses have gained positive 
results in neutralizing some terrorists and mitigating the drivers of radicalization, they need 
to be continuously assessed as conditions in the region continue to evolve. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Despite the government’s efforts to counter terrorism, it has failed to address 
specific challenges in the southern Philippines. The complex and multifaceted factors 
affecting Mindanao enable various terrorists and Islamist groups to continue to operate and 
conduct atrocities against government forces and civilian communities. Terror groups 
continue to evolve and become more brutal, resorting to tactics like suicide bombings, 
which are difficult to prevent. At the same time, the government response continues to 
focus on military actions rather than on non-military programs in addressing the problem. 
These ongoing responses have proved to be “insufficient to mitigate” the armed conflict 
and violence in Mindanao.212 Although military actions are important to the CT strategy, 
military solutions alone will not address the root causes and grievances of Muslim 
insurgency and terrorism in Mindanao. A holistic and sustainable approach is needed to 
complement the ongoing government responses and comprehensively address terrorism to 
bring peace in Mindanao. 
Therefore, this thesis offers three recommendations to address persistent terrorism 
and to eventually bring about development and peace in Mindanao. 
1. Create a Multi-agency National Task Force to Synchronize and 
Supervise Government CT and Antiterrorism Efforts 
The Philippine government should create a multi-agency national task force that is 
solely dedicated to addressing terrorism in Mindanao. This task force must involve the 
various Islamist groups. This is to ensure that all counterterrorism efforts are synchronized 
and complement each other. This “super-body” government agency can be compared to 
 
212 Rhoades and Helmus. 
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the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC)213 
whose goal is to end the threat of communism by utilizing the “whole-of-nation approach 
in attaining inclusive and sustainable peace.”214 With its institutionalized and 
comprehensive approach, the NTF-ELCAC was able, between 2016 and 2019, to 
encourage thousands of fighters to surrender and cleared 822 barangays (districts) from 
New People’s Army influence. These areas will also benefit from the Barangay 
Development Programs.215 Projects will include farm-to-market roads, electrification, 
classrooms, water systems, communal irrigations, housing, and other livelihood programs 
to address the root causes of the conflict.  
In this way, a similar task force will enable the government to synchronize and 
implement a whole-of-nation approach in addressing the causes of terrorism and violence 
in Mindanao. The government will also be able to work in rebuilding Marawi and other 
war-torn areas in Mindanao, educating the youth on Islamic teaching focused on countering 
violent ideologies and extremism, and promoting dialogue and peace talks with different 
Islamist and terrorist groups. Furthermore, the government should promote good 
governance, equipping the local Muslim leaders with the necessary skills and tools to run 
their political affairs. Having a task force dedicated to addressing terrorism will enable the 
government to partner with the Moro people to holistically address the root causes of 
terrorism and the grievances of the Moro people.  
 
213 The National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC) is a national 
task force formed December 2018 through the Executive Order (EO) 70 signed by President Duterte. It 
aimed to holistically end armed conflicts and their causes, involving the CPP-NPA-NDF that have been 
hounding the country for 52 years. 
214 “About the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC),” 
National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC), accessed April 28, 2021, 
https://www.ntfelcac.org/. 
215 “Government Says Ready to Roll Out ₱16.4-B Projects for NPA-Free Barangays,” CNN 
Philippines, March 6, 2021, https://www.cnn.ph/news/2021/3/6/barangay-development-projects-NTF-
ELCAC-NPA.html. 
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2. Upgrade and Sustain CT Capabilities of the AFP and Other Security 
Forces 
Terrorist attacks like the 2013 Zamboanga Siege and the 2017 Marawi siege, where 
the actions and responses of the AFP ultimately defeated the enemy, offer lessons and 
opportunities for the government to improve its CT capabilities, especially in joint 
operations and urban fighting. This upgrade will entail organizational development, 
recruitment of personnel, sustained logistical support, enhanced equipment, dedicated lift 
assets, and realistic trainings. The new AFP Special Operations Command (AFPSOCOM), 
created to integrate and provide command and control among special units of the AFP, 
should actively promote jointness and inter-operability operations and trainings among 
special units and military assets of the Army, Navy and Air Force. These upgrades and 
sustainment should also include better intelligence fusion and better coordination among 
security forces, with the AFP as the lead unit in counterterrorism operations. Having 
improved coordination and distinction of roles and responsibilities among security forces 
will enhance the conduct of joint operations, especially in a dense urban environment 
where coordination is most needed. In addition, the AFP and other security forces like the 
Philippine National Police should be equipped with the proper knowledge and skills in 
implementing the different CVE programs to effectively address radicalization and other 
non-military issues in the region. These pro-active capabilities will enable prepare the 
security forces to be more capable in addressing the evolving security challenges in 
Mindanao.  
3. Enhance Security Cooperation with Other Countries 
Despite the limitations and differences in implementing counterterrorism efforts, 
the Philippines should continue to pursue stronger security cooperation with other 
countries. The U.S. security assistance packages, especially during its global war on terror, 
have helped improve the AFP’s counterterrorism capabilities. U.S. assistance resulted in 
the creation of CT units and capabilities that have contributed to numerous successes in 
countering terrorism. Likewise, the Trilateral Maritime Patrol by Indonesia, Philippines, 
and Malaysia, although limited, has also contributed to the CT efforts of the country.  
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While the U.S. government and others continue to support these programs, 
however, the disastrous effects of the Marawi siege, as well as suicide bombings, require 
enhanced security cooperation between the Philippines and to other countries. Such 
enhancements may include more advanced CT equipment and robust intelligence support 
package, information sharing, conduct of joint CT trainings, and strengthened border and 
maritime patrols with ASEAN nations. In addition, aside from military equipment and 
trainings, the U.S. government and other partner nations may consider non-military 
initiatives like supporting educational opportunities, livelihood projects, infrastructure 
projects, and other socioeconomic programs to affected areas in Mindanao. These efforts 
will greatly help to complement the government’s effort to address the socioeconomic 
problems in the region. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Addressing the persistent threat of terrorism and violence in Mindanao requires the 
full participation of all sectors of the community. This job is not for the military alone. It 
requires a whole-of-nation approach including, especially, the people of Mindanao. This 
effort entails comprehensive and sustainable approaches complementing the present 
counterterrorism efforts of the government. If not addressed, terrorism will continue to 
pose a critical challenge to the Philippine government that will threaten to destabilize the 
country. Terrorist groups will continue to employ extreme tactics like suicide bombings in 
pursuing their political goals. No amount of neutralization of terrorists will be effective if 
the government fails to address the root causes of this problem, especially the grievances 
of the Moro people. The Philippine government should continue to pursue comprehensive 
and sustainable approaches that will enable it to address the root causes of the problems, 
which are largely based on socioeconomic and political issues. A comprehensive and 
holistic approach acceptable to all will mitigate and address the threats of terrorism and 
can eventually bring stability, development, and most importantly peace in Mindanao.  
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